Status Quo In The Army
Aerial incursions across the median line have continued on a near daily basis, and China has announced additional monthlong live-fire drills in the Bohai Sea and south of the Yellow Sea. Similar to prior instances of heightened tension in the Taiwan Strait, the most recent episode is likely to drag on for multiple weeks, if not months, ushering in a new, increasingly volatile status in cross-strait and U.S.-China relations.
Status Quo In The Army
Evolving perceptions on all three sides have led to an escalatory spiral in which each side believes it is responding to changes initiated by the other; actions or statements that one side views as reaffirmations of existing policy are perceived by the other as changes to the status quo, necessitating a counter response. Like the security dilemma often ascribed to military dynamics, the action-reaction cycle in cross-strait relations has the potential to quickly escalate from a political crisis into armed conflict.
India on Monday renewed its emphasis on restoring the pre-April 2020 status quo ante along its Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China even as the negotiation between the two nations to resolve the two-year-long military stand-off in eastern Ladakh remained stalled since March 11.
India, however, continued to demand that China should not make any unilateral move to change the status quo in the future. Even External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar reiterated it while interacting with media persons after his latest meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New Delhi on March 25.
Though Gen Pande on Monday reiterated the demand for restoration of the pre-April 2020 status quo along the LAC, it is still not clear if the Indian Army would eventually seek to revisit the arrangements it worked out with the Chinese PLA in Galwan Valley or on the northern bank of Pangong Tso.
His emphasis on return to the pre-April 2020 status quo may also be limited to the Indian Army demanding that the Chinese PLA must withdraw troops deployed along and across the LAC since the beginning of the stand-off in eastern Ladakh.
On the security side, China is investing heavily in building the Peoples' Liberation Army and has learned from the United States the efficacy of joint warfare. "The military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more unfavorable for the United States and our allies," Davidson said. "With this imbalance, we are accumulating risk that may embolden China to unilaterally change the status quo before our forces may be able to deliver an effective response. The greatest danger the United States and our allies face in the region is the erosion of conventional deterrence vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China."
Acheson judged that virtually all members of the United Nations, including mostof those actively participating in Korea, strongly opposed any general advanceacross the 38th Parallel. This opposition was based on the belief that once theenemy had been driven out of South Korea the primary objective of repelling theaggression had been accomplished; that an advance in North Korea would make anearly negotiated settlement of the Korean fighting impossible, since the enemywould accept nothing less than the status quo ante bellum; that crossing theparallel would greatly increase the pressure for extending the hostilities intoChina and in turn would involve American military resources to an increasedextent in indecisive operations in Asia; and that a crossing would greatlyincrease the risk of Soviet involvement and general war. 
To both Departments, it appeared that the most logical beginning of a negotiatedsettlement was for President Truman to appeal directly to the ChineseCommunists. For while earlier attempts to bring about negotiations had failed,President Truman had in none of these instances been the one to suggest openingnegotiations. Furthermore, the situation seemed particularly propitious becauseenemy forces were being pushed back into North Korea and could thereforenegotiate on the basis of their prewar status.  041b061a72